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It is a great privilege and honour for me to be speaking on this occasion, not
only as Dean of one of the two law faculties which are sponsors of this event,
but also in response to a paper of such lucidity and quality. It has occurred to
me that in holding this conference we are not only celebrating the
anniversaries of the South African Law Journal, of Juta & Co, Ltd and of
the Constitution1 itself. We are also marking a milestone of another event
which has special significance for administrative law. This year marks the
175th anniversary of the Charter of Justice of 1828 which effectively
established the foundations of the Supreme Court of South Africa and
therefore the beginnings of the system of judicial review of administrative
action which has for so long formed the bedrock of our administrative law.2 In
another quirk of coincidence,I could not help noticing that the official dinner
of this conference was held in a hotel which is part of a shopping complex the
development of which itself led to one of the great landmarks of
administrative law in the courts of this country, in the case of Administrator,
Transvaal and The Firs Investments (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council.3
In responding to Justice O’Regan’s paper I must at the outset acknowledge
unequivocally that what we have heard has been a typically clear and
authoritative statement of the development of and challenges facing South
African administrative law. It is particularly good to be reminded of the
‘dismal science’4 of the past, a statement that has certainly become a citation
classic,much like Mureinik’s ‘culture of justification’.5 I also readily agree with
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Justice O’Regan that there has been a seismic shift in our administrative law,
and I note that she has hinted at further developments. By way of an agenda
for further reform of this area of the law,6 I would like to focus on four issues
raised by or adverted to in Justice O’Regan’s paper which are likely to
determine the shape and direction of administrative law in the future.
The interrelationship of administrative law and other branches of law
We have been given an excellent reminder that administrative law in the past
was very often the only remedy for those seeking to curtail or ameliorate the
effects of executive and administrative tyranny. This led to the danger of
administrative law being extended too much and spread too thinly,as we were
warned by Schreiner JA in the Laubscher case in 19587 in regard to the
application of the audi alteram partem rule.It is entirely appropriate, indeed it
is a relief, to note that many such applications for judicial review in the past
would now be pursued by reference to other rights in the Bill of Rights. For
example, Lockhat8 would now be contested in reliance on the right to
equality;9 Ngwevela10 would be contested by claiming a right to freedom of
movement;11 the SA Defence and Aid Fund case12 would clearly be a candidate
for freedom of association;13 while the many applications to contest the
lawfulness of detention without trial14 would be enhanced by relying on the
criminal procedural rights15 in our Constitution today.It is likely that the right
of access to court16 would have stopped the effectiveness of the ouster clause
in Staatspresident v United Democratic Front17 much more effectively than some
artificial reliance on the ultra vires doctrine.
But this relief of the inordinate burden placed on the right to seek judicial
review of administrative action in the past is not as pervasive as may appear at
first sight, in two areas. First, because of the narrow definition of
‘administrative action’ in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 (PAJA), which may in any event not pass constitutional muster,18 there
will probably be circumstances in which the common-law form of
administrative review may continue to be available to those who wish to
question administrative-type action taken by non-state organs exercising
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public power. Secondly, in the context of the constitutionalization of
administrative law, there will be situations on the edge, so to speak, which
will throw out challenges to other areas of the common law. For example,
contract and delict will be challenged to fashion appropriate procedures and
remedies where the state is exercising ‘private’ power. (This has been
addressed to some extent in a paper dealing with the effect of the Constitution
on the law of delict;19 a challenge that was presaged by a paper given by
Cockrell20 at the first Breakwater Conference held early in 1993.)
Contextual values
It is very important to focus on the values that surround our new
administrative law,which are mainly to be found in the prominence accorded
to accountability, responsiveness, and openness as ‘founding values’ of the
Constitution;21 to the requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and
procedural fairness in s 33; and to the obligations placed on the public
administration under s 195. In the latter regard I have always believed that the
developmental and service-emphasizing objectives set by the Constitution for
the public administration constitute a justiciable framework for review, and I
look forward to the day when they are regularly used as such in court.
‘Efficiency’ is also relevant as a value,and is normally seen to be an implied
inhibition on the extent of administrative compliance with accountability,
responsiveness and openness.This, at least, appears to have been the intention
behind the inclusion in the Constitution of s 33(3)(c), an added justification
for the legislative limitation of the rights in s 33, and this was clearly the
motivating consideration behind the Justice Portfolio Committee’s partial
mutilation of the draft Bill presented to it by the Working Group of the South
African Law Commission.22 Incidentally, I have always been intrigued by the
status of s 33(3), for it would have lapsed had no Administrative Justice Act
appeared within three years; and now that it has done its work, one wonders
what relevance can be accorded to it today. Be that as it may, ‘efficiency’ can
also cut another way: it could well be argued that the achievement of
administrative efficiency is indeed enhanced by compliance with progressively
improving levels of accountability, responsiveness and openness, so that it is
not a basis for justifying the limitation of such values but rather for
emphasizing their ever-expanding enforcement. In other words, the greater
its accountability, the more efficient administrative action will become.
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Continuing importance of the common law in the interpretation of section 33 and
the Act
I fully accept that the common law is not some independent,parallel system as
decided by the Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion,23 but it must still assist in understanding concepts such as the grounds of
review contained in s 6 of the PAJA, the doctrine of legitimate expectation24
and so on. In one particular case, at least, it may well live on.Section 6(2)(i) of
the PAJA provides for the review of action which is ‘otherwise unlawful or
unconstitutional’, and it must be assumed that the common law-grounds of
review not included in the PAJA, for example the rule against vagueness and
the no-fettering rule, will surely be candidates for inclusion here, unless they
can be shoe-horned in under ‘lawfulness’ or ‘reasonableness’. While I am
dealing with this matter, may I express the hope that the courts will ignore
entirely the misguided circularity of Wednesbury unreasonableness25 which
appears to be provided for in s 6(2)(h) of the Act, and rather adopt a
proportionality test so well known to our own constitutional jurisprudence26
and to European administrative law, and so elegantly phrased in the Law
Commission’s draft Bill:27
‘The effect of the action is unreasonable, including any (i) disproportionality between the
adverse and beneficial consequences of the action, and (ii) less restrictive means to achieve
the purpose for which the action was taken.’
The ‘D’ word
The idea of ‘deference’ underlies several parts of Justice O’Regan’s paper,
although it is never mentioned expressly in it. It is completely understandable
in this country that the idea of deference has a thoroughly bad press,being too
easily associated with ‘deference as submission’ rather than ‘deference as
respect’, as Dyzenhaus28 and Hoexter29 have argued. If we mean that we
should be considering adopting an approach characterized by deference as
respect, which I assume to be axiomatic, let us just call it ‘respect’ or
‘respectful’, and not use ‘deference’ or ‘deferential’. But labels are less
important than the underlying approach or philosophy and its consequences,
as Schreiner JA once more reminded us in regard to the classification of
administrative functions in Pretoria North Town Council30 almost 50 years ago.
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Justice O’Regan has made the same point, and I agree entirely with her that
an emphasis on approach or philosophy is what is needed now in South
African administrative law. The lead must come from the judiciary, especially
the Constitutional Court, which has provided some clues so far.
For example,we have the following statement from Chaskalson P in Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association:31
‘Rationality in this sense is a minimum threshold requirement applicable to the exercise of
all public power by members of the Executive and its functionaries.Action that fails to pass
this threshold is . . . unlawful. The setting of this standard does not mean that the Courts
can or should substitute their opinions as to what is appropriate for the opinions of those
in whom the power has been vested. As long as the purpose sought to be achieved by
the exercise of public power is within the authority of the functionary, and as long as the
functionary’s decision, viewed objectively, is rational, a Court cannot interfere with the
decision because it disagrees with it, or considers that the power was exercised
inappropriately.’
A different emphasis is seen in the following statement from O’Regan J in
Dawood:32
‘It is not ordinarily sufficient for the Legislature merely to say that discretionary powers that
may be exercised in a manner that could limit rights should be read in a manner consistent
with the Constitution in the light of the constitutional obligations placed on such officials to
respect the Constitution . . .Guidance will often be required to ensure that the Constitution
takes root in the daily practice of governance.’
But we need much more, and references to the ultra vires doctrine no
longer assist us directly: although we can learn from the debate in the United
Kingdom about the basis of and justification for judicial review of
administrative action in the ultra vires doctrine,such as has been described,the
matter is settled as far as we are concerned. The basis of the authority of
the judiciary to review administrative action lies in the Constitution, and the
Constitutional Court has repeatedly asserted its authority to do so.However,a
number of subsidiary questions arise.
 What theory of respect animates the drawing of the line between
executive action33 and administrative action?
 Does such differentiation (between executive and administrative action)
make a real difference when it comes to standards of review? We have
seen in the SARFU case34 as well in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association35 that the executive powers provided for in s 84(2) of the
Constitution are subject to review in terms of the principle of legality.To
what extent do the provisions of s 33 and the PAJA constitute a more
invasive degree of review?
 How will ‘reasonableness’be interpreted? Will the courts rely on a notion
of ‘rationality’ as we saw in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, or
‘proportionality’ as Froneman DJP set out in Carephone?36 In the latter
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regard, we must note the widespread use of proportionality as a ground
of review in the United Kingdom and Europe37 as well as the
formulation proposed by the Law Commission in relation to the PAJA.38
I make so bold as to argue that the statutory inclusion of both ‘rationality’
(in s 6(2)(f)(ii)) and ‘reasonableness’ (in s 6(2)(h)) as grounds of review in
the PAJA leads inescapably to the conclusion that a test of the
‘proportionality’ of administrative action is the missing element which
gives meaning to ‘reasonableness’ as more than mere rationality. In other
words, rationality plus (at least) proportionality equals reasonableness.
 Do we not need to move to a vision of ‘substantive fairness’ as a key
element of ‘reasonableness’, for we already have ‘procedural fairness’
protected in s 33 and the PAJA? In this regard the distinction between the
majority in Bel Porto39 and the judgment of Mokgoro and Sachs JJ in that
case seems to me to be significant.
In sum on this point, I would argue that judges must respect the legitimate
decision-making activities of both the legislature and the executive but should
not give up too much of their review power at this stage by setting the test for
rationality at too low a threshold.
Conclusion
I would like to offer two final comments in response to Justice O’Regan’s
paper.Firstly,as so cogently argued by Hoexter,40 we need urgently to expand
our legal horizons beyond backward-looking judicial review of adminis-
trative action (of the red-light variety,suspicious of all administrative power in
a watch-dog mode) to a prospective, progressive improvement of the
decision-making process in all administrative action, and the creation of
specialized tribunals or fora for administrative appeals, on the merits, in a
systematic way.This development is anticipated in the ministerial power given
in s 10(2) of the PAJA,which has not yet been acted on. Incidentally, a recent
Australian study41 after 25 years of their new administrative law indicates that
the heightened requirement of administrative accountability has led to
considerably improved decision-making processes within the administration
itself,which have ultimately been widely welcomed by bureaucratic leaders.
Secondly, we need openly to acknowledge that the old approach to
distinguishing review from appeal is no longer tenable. It is also not necessary,
as our courts have now been expressly authorized to determine the
reasonableness of administrative action, which must contain a merits-based
substantive element.However,this is not an appeal and nor is it mere procedural
A  RESPONSE  TO  JUSTICE  O’REGAN 443
37 See the treatment of Jürgen Schwarze ‘The convergence of the administrative laws of the EU member
states’ (1998) 4 European Public law 191 at 195ff.
38 See note 27.
39 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC).
40 Cora Hoexter ‘The current state of South African administrative law’ in Corder & Van der Vijver op
cit note 6, particularly at 25–7.
41 See Robin Creyke & John McMillan ‘Executive perceptions of administrative law — An empirical
study’ (2002) 9 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 164.
review: perhaps it would be better to describe what is required now, in all
honesty, as ‘substantive’ or ‘wide’ review. We must acknowledge, too, that
the merits were inevitably referred to, even in the circumstances of ‘proce-
dural’ or ‘narrow’ review, in our own wicked past.
So we eagerly await the case or judgment of the Constitutional Court that
will fix the answers, for the time being, to these questions. In doing so, I have
no doubt that the court will respect the different spheres of authority
delimited by the doctrine of the separation of powers but that,mindful of the
history of the abuse of executive and administrative power under apartheid
with which Justice O’Regan so vividly started her paper, the court will
reserve its space to call the executive and administration to account in terms of
the Constitution and the law on all forms of the exercise of public
power — without deference, but with respect.
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